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Abstract—Since the revelations of interference in the 2016 US
Presidential elections, the UK’s Brexit referendum, the Catalan
independence vote in 2017 and numerous other major political
discussions by malicious online actors and propaganda bots, there
has been increasing interest in understanding how to detect and
characterize such threats. We focus on some of the recent research
in algorithms for detection of propaganda botnets and metrics
by which their impact can be measured.
Index Terms—propoganda bots, botnets, social media,
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of computational propaganda has received in-
creased attention over the past two years due to the role it
played in the US 2016 Presidential elections, the UK’s Brexit
referendum [1], the Catalan independence vote in 2017 [2],
and numerous other political discussions since 2010 [3]. It
was widely reported in the US media that ‘fake news’ stories
circulated on social media impacted the public discussion
during the US 2016 Presidential campaign. Specifically, com-
putational propaganda has been defined as the “assemblage
of social-media platforms, autonomous agents, and big data
tasked with the manipulation of public opinion [4].” It gen-
erally encompasses activities by dedicated, malicious human
users (trolls), automated accounts (bots), and cyborgs human
curated automated accounts. The primary focus of this paper
is on bots. The specific role that was played by propaganda
bots in the 2016 US election was explored quantitatively
by Bessi and Ferrara [5] who found that almost 19% of
the Twitter conversation during final months of the election
was attributable to propaganda bots, and that as many as
400,000 propaganda bots may have been active. Twitter has
put the number of confirmed bots at 50,258 which highlights
a typical discrepancy in bot declaration criteria which we
discuss below. The notoriety of these intrusions into political
events seems to have spurred greater interest in researching
methods for detecting and characterizing social bots, and
political propaganda bots in particular.
In the early 2000’s bots were primarily employed to conduct
DDoS attacks and deliver malware [6]. The Marina, Conficker,
and Zeus botnets are particularly well-known examples of
this model. These bots had a fairly mechanistic, machine-
to-machine mission. In contrast, social bots attempt to fool
humans into believing that they (the bots) are other humans.
In effect, they must pass a Turing test to accomplish their
mission. For example, the Ashley Madison website, which
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advertised itself as a forum for connecting people interested
in adulterous relationships, employed femme-bots to pose as
real women in attempts to lure more men to the site. It is
estimated that the site had 12,000 actual women participating
and 70,000 bots posing as women [7].
Much, indeed most, of the current literature on social bots
focuses on one specific social media platform Twitter. This is
because the Twitter API provides unrivalled access to details
of user interactions, user profiles, and even content [8]. It is
reasonable to assume that propaganda bots are being employed
to the extent they can be on other social media platforms as
well, but there are significant barriers to research on these
platforms and that has led to few papers addressing platforms
other than Twitter. We address one example in this paper [9].
In this paper we summarize the emerging trends in detection
of propaganda bots and techniques applied to characterize
their impact and influence. The paper is organized as follows:
in section 2, we review some of the most successful recent
efforts at detecting propaganda bots. In section 3 we discuss
the properties that make propaganda bots effective and means
of measuring those properties. Section 4 addresses the need for
detection and characterization research to stay abreast of the
adversary’s continual advances in sophistication of propaganda
botnets. In section 5 we make our closing remarks.
II. DETECTION OF PROPAGANDA BOTS
Detection of bots has been a subject of study for more than
a decade, however the properties of botnets aimed at exerting
political influence heretofore referred to as propaganda bots
present particular signatures and behaviors that set them apart
from other types of botnets. In this paper we focus on
methods that have been applied specifically to detection of
propaganda bots (or in the more general case, influence bots)
operating in the social media ecosystem. As we will see, the
goals of widely disseminating a message, creating ‘trending’
topics, and earning reputation and trust force constraints on
propaganda bots that will result in user accounts that look and
behave differently from the typical human users on a given
social media platform.
While it is our convention to refer to all automata that are
aimed at leveraging social media for the purposes of spreading
a political ideology as ‘propaganda bots,’ it is important to note
that these bots manifest several different types of approaches
to spread their message. Some make no attempt to mimic
human behavior and simply post news, fake news, or other
information feeds. Others, like the Ashley Madison bots, have
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arguably passed a Turing test in that they successfully interact
with human users, engaging them in conversation.
A. Detection Metrics
When evaluating the performance of various bot detection
classifiers or detection algorithms, one might think that defin-
ing a success metric should be straight forward, but this is not
the case. The most commonly accepted metrics in the literature
are precision and recall, and the F1 score, which attempts to
balance precision and recall. Others report in terms of true
positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR), or more
efficiently the area under the curve (AUC) which refers to
the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, which plots
TPR vs. FPR. These terms are defined as follows [9]:
TP = number of true positive declarations, (1)
FP = number of true negative declarations,
TN = number of false positive declarations,
FN = number of false negative declarations,
TPR =
TP
(TP + FN)
,
i.e., percentage of bots correctly identified as bots,
FPR =
FP
(FP + TN)
,
i.e., percentage of legitimate users misclassified as bots, AUC:
normalized to range [0,1], where 1 indicates perfect perfor-
mance,
Precision =
TP
(TP + FP )
,
Recall =
TP
(TP + TN)
,
and
F1 = 2
Precision ∗ Recall
Precision + Recall
.
While many researchers report precision as their primary
metric, Morstatter, et al. [10] argue that the F1 score is
the most relevant since merely reporting precision does not
properly account for false negatives, and thus many bots
will go undetected. However, the operational implication of
a declaration that a specific user is or is not a bot carries
real world consequences. Apart from a strictly research per-
spective, merely declaring bot or human has no value. The
value proposition is associated with the ensuing action implied
by that declaration. For example, Twitter has a policy of
suspending user accounts that are deemed to be bots and in
recent years they have inadvertently suspended the accounts
of legitimate users who were mistaken as bots [11]. This
obviously has negative business consequences for a social
media provider, so Twitter tends to err on the side of caution
and minimizes the change of false positives at the expense
of false negatives. Some authors mention this as a cause
for discrepancy in assessment of level of bot activity when
comparing their detection algorithm to Twitter’s [10], [12].
B. Data sets
As with most supervised learning approaches, a major
challenge is finding sufficient labeled data in a training set
that is representative of the data that will be encountered
‘in the wild.’ There are several publicly available data sets
for detection and/or characterization of propaganda bots. We
briefly describe some of the more widely used ones here.
DARPA conducted a Twitter Bot Challenge [12] in 2015
and created a synthetic data set in which the 39 bots were of
course known with 100% certainty. While this data is no longer
available to the public, for the duration of the challenge it
provided an excellent ground truth, making possible a head-to-
head comparison of the techniques used by the six competing
teams. We describe those results in the next section.
Lee, et al. [13] set up 60 honeypot Twitter accounts to lure
bots to interact, and over the course of seven months in 2011,
collected 23,869 bot followers. The rationale in structuring the
honeypot accounts is that by tweeting frequently, tweeting ran-
domly chosen content, frequently using @ reply messages to
each other and tweeting often on trending topics, the honeypot
accounts would be exhibiting behavior attractive to bots, but
not of interest to humans. Twitter eventually suspended 23%
of the harvested accounts, with the suspensions lagging the
honeypot detections by an average of 18 days. The remaining
77% of the accounts were also classified as bots by the
researchers based on cluster analysis which revealed 4 distinct
classes of behavior. This data set of bot accounts is publicly
available.
The University of Indiana [14] combined 15,000 of the
bot accounts from Lee’s honeypot data with 16,000 human
accounts, which they verified by manually annotating 3,000 of
the accounts. The human accounts were obtained via Twitter’s
API over a three-month period starting in October 2015.
The annotated accounts were drawn 300 from each decile of
the team’s initial bot classification score. This merged data
set is publicly available and researchers can compare their
classification results to those published by the University of
Indiana on this data set in the above reference.
A data set was collected by a University of Arizona and
Carnegie-Mellon University team during the Arab Spring
movement in Libya from Feb 2011 to Feb 2013. [10] Tweets
were collected via the Twitter API and selected by a set of
keyword hashtags provided by subject matter experts. Initial
labeled data was based on Twitter account suspensions and
deletions, which accounted for 7.5% of the harvested accounts.
The authors assert that this percentage is low due to Twitter’s
tendency to err on the side of caution when suspending
accounts. The same team employed a honeypot approach
which drew 3,602 bots and combined this with a set of
3,107 human accounts. The human accounts were obtained
by beginning with a set of 10 manually verified human users
and collecting accounts that they were following, assuming
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humans generally don’t follow malicious bots. Both of these
data sets are available.
C. Detection and classification techniques
Most of the literature discusses bot detection as a binary
classification task. [10], [14], [12], [15], [16], [17] Indeed,
the University of Indiana has made their detection algorithms
available through a public web interface to an application
titled BotOrNot [18]. This tool (now known as Botometer and
available at https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/) returns a bot score
when a query is submitted for a given username.
Most of the literature to date has documented research on
feature-based binary classification. The set of features varies
between approaches as does the number of features used.
At one extreme, Varol, et al. [14] incorporate 1,150 features
in their classification algorithm that forms the basis for the
BotOrNot engine. At the other end of the spectrum, Duh,
Rupnik, and Korosak [1] claim comparable performance with
a single feature – the “tweetstorm” – derived from the temporal
properties of Twitter behavior. Ironically the latter study used
the BotOrNot tool to benchmark ‘ground truth.’
Most researchers seem to have focused on four categories of
features: user profiles, network connections, activity/behavior,
and semantic content. These features were used to some
extent by each of the top 3 teams in the DARPA Twitter
Bot Challenge [12]. Within these broad categories there are
some features or combinations of features which consistently
prove to be predictive. User profile data has proven useful
in identifying simple bots. Cases where there are obvious
mismatches between name and gender, or where a profile
picture or location are missing have proven to be strong
indicators of a bot [19]. Other user information includes type
of platform used to access the site. Bots rarely come from
mobile devices, while humans often do, so platform is also a
good indicator [9].
The social ties formed by bots usually are a very strong
feature differentiating human from bot accounts. Several of the
teams we studied had good success with variations of features
based on the ratio of followers to followees [20], [21], [22].
Bots tend to follow other bots, and humans tend to follow
other humans [14]. The impact of propaganda bots is realized
when humans follow or retweet bots.
One of the strongest subcategories of the behavior and
activity features is temporal behavior. Because propaganda
botnets are attempting to draw attention to their topic, they
frequently act in temporally correlated ways that create a
detectable signature. [1], [14], [23], [24]. Other behavioral
features include following circadian cycles for appropriate
time zones, diversity in rate and topic of tweets, etc.
Some researchers also rely strongly on semantic content and
sentiment for classification [17]. Reliance on content has two
weaknesses it is not language agnostic, so the applicability
of the tool is limited to the languages known by the research
team [17], [20]. Further, the keywords and hashtags must be
updated for each emerging topic of study. Still, it is common
practice to filter based on topical keywords when assembling
an initial data set associated with a particular political event
or movement [23].
The metrics reported for most studies usually indicate good
precision, however, the data sets often vary from experiment to
experiment. This may be indicative of having tuned classifica-
tion parameters to a specific topic domain. (some researchers
claim they outperform other techniques on the selected data
set, when the competitor’s technique claims higher precision
on their respective data set). At present there is no widely
accepted set of labeled data that has the community wide
acceptance that the ImageNet data set [25] does for the
machine vision community.
The general process learned from the DARPA Twitter Bot
Challenge is followed by all of the above-mentioned classifi-
cation approaches. That process can be summarized as [12]:
1) Manually verify a set of label data. This can be done by
subject matter heuristics, or by using blocked or banned
accounts (implying trust in the social media provider’s
algorithms and experts.)
2) Clustering and outlier detection. This helps determine
most salient features for classification. Standard clus-
tering algorithms are usually used: k-NN and k-means
being most common.
3) Classification and outlier analysis. Standard machine
learning algorithms are normally used.
So far we have discussed feature-based classifiers that, for
the most part, rely on traditional machine learning classifi-
cation algorithms: regression, decision trees, support vector
machines, and random forest (RF). Most of the teams whose
research we have discussed above evaluate all of these methods
and report which technique worked best with their feature set.
In most of the cases we studied the random forest approach
provides the best results for example, the Indiana University
Team [14] tried each of the standard classifier routines in the
scikit-learn library and found that RF was the most accurate
algorithm for their features, yielding a 0.95 AUC for the initial
dataset and an 0.85 for the expanded data set with FPR of 0.15
and FNR of 0.11.
In addition to these more traditional approaches, several
novel approaches have been reported recently, and we will
mention a few here. In their study of BREXIT related propa-
ganda, Duh, Rupnik, and Korosak [1] employ an Ising spin-
glass model borrowed from physics to measure correlation
of temporal activity. Cai, Li, and Zhang [26] report the first
application of deep learning to social bot detection using
the Arab Spring honeypot data [10] and report competitive
results with an F1 score of 87%. Two unsupervised learning
approaches have also been reported. The first is the DeBOT
algorithm [24], which employs dynamic time warping as a
robust means of correlating temporal behavior. In addition,
DeBOT is capable of running in near real time, as opposed
to forensically. Another unsupervised approach is found in
the Associative Affinity Factor Analysis (AFAA) algorithm
developed by Sadiq, et al. [27] which used patterns from
tweets by celebrities who were self-declared supporters of
Clinton or Trump in the 2016 election as data to create
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behavior models for their own 3,000 bot army. Their bots
injected data into the discussion. An unsupervised learning
algorithm based on Multi-Factor Analysis was then applied
for bot detection, and hierarchical clustering was then used to
separate the bots into factions (Democrat or Republican) based
on content. Finally, we mention a very brief concept paper by
Cresci, et al. [28] which suggests the idea of using genetic
algorithms to generate likely variations in botnet design. His
premise is that the diversity of potential botnets would provide
researchers with opportunities to anticipate the development
of more sophisticated botnets, reducing the risk of technical
surprise. The author notes that such approaches have been
helpful in spam filtering.
Lastly we mention the only paper which we considered
that looked at a social media platform other than Twitter,
namely Sina-Weibo, the Chinese microblogging tool that is
functionally similar to Twitter. Dan and Jieqi [9] obtained a
dataset of about 3,000 humans and 3,000 bots directly from
Sina-Weibo. Several features were selected, and one feature
at a time was removed to measure each feature’s importance
to classification. The most salient being: fan/follower ratio,
retransmission rate (like retweet), and platform type (mobile or
PC). Both random forest and C4.5 classifier algorithms were
tested and random forest slightly outperformed with an F1
score of 0.94. It is easy to see that the methodology and results
are similar to those obtained for Twitter.
III. CHARACTERIZING INFLUENCE
In order to fully appreciate the impact of computational
propaganda, it is not enough to simply quantify the proportion
of bots participating in political discourse, or even to estimate
the volume of traffic they are generating. These measures
are certainly useful and are usually a necessary first step in
characterization. However, they do not provide a complete
picture of actual influence.
Influence could manifest itself in a variety of ways affecting
the character of the debate in a social media forum by
moving the debate towards or away from a given position
or exacerbating polarization as documented in the case of the
Catalan election [2], or obfuscating real issues by hijacking
the discussion and leading it off track (smokescreening) as
seen in the Syrian uprising [29]. Of even more concern is the
prospect that influence of online bots will manifest itself in
real world actions as opposed to merely affecting the character
of the online discussion. Arguably, this is already happening.
ISIS has already run online propaganda campaigns aimed at
encouraging youth to become radicalized [13] in support of
their recruitment efforts.
Several researchers have tested the efficacy of influence
tactics by creating their own influence bot nets and measuring
their effects [27], [30]. To date the results have varied widely.
Again, there is no canonical data set on which tools can be
compared. In one study, Murthy, et al. [31] tasked 12 human
users to send Tweets during the UK Prime Minster’s online
Q&A session in an attempt to influence the discussion. Half of
the human users had bots attached to follow their accounts and
retweet. The experiment did not result in a significant change
in topic. The failure to influence was assessed to be due to the
fact that the users and bots were all new accounts created just
before the experiment and therefore lacked established connec-
tivity. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Aiello [30] was
able to create a bot on a book enthusiast social media forum
which was designed to have no distinctive human features, and
no preexisting trust relationships, yet this bot quickly became
one of the most popular users on the forum. The success was
attributed to a quirk in the design of the site. The site left a
record in every user’s ‘guestbook’ of the other users who had
visited their page. Since the bot was programmed to crawl the
site and visit all pages, every user on the site saw the bot as a
guest on their page. Curiosity drove many users to look at the
bot’s page, and at this point the popularity algorithm (similar
to Page Rank) determined that the bot must be extraordinarily
popular and began recommending it to human users.
A. Metrics of Influence
Social Media companies such as Twitter typically compute
their own influence scores. Twitter uses ‘Klout.’ There is a
commercial advantage to being able to offer product incen-
tives, such as test drives of new cars, to influential users.
Google’s Page Rank algorithm is another widely used means
of calculating centrality in a network.
Bots have a long tradition of exploiting these internal
metrics to their advantage. In the online gaming world, some
users are willing to pay real-world money to purchase in-game
advantages [15], so there is financial incentive to develop bots
who will play the game to score in-game items or advantages
to sell to human users.
An intuitively satisfying measure of influence, used by
Abokhodair, et al. [29] is to compute a cumulative rank sum
of the retweets among the top 100 retweets by human users
that were originally tweeted by bots. This measure gives a
direct indication of the extent to which humans have read
bot-generated content and thought highly enough of their
messages and their credibility that they shared them with
other humans. Similarly, a study of the effectiveness of ISIS
online propaganda [21] looked for human users who were
not tweeting or retweeting ISIS content at the beginning of
their 18-month study, but were at the end, and found that
25,538 ISIS supporters created 54,358 infected users’ during
the period of the study. If measured as a contagious disease,
the contagion rate is similar to SARS, Ebola, or HIV/AIDS.
IV. COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECTION
With any technology which becomes weaponized, there is
an inevitable race between development of game changing
technology, developing countermeasures to that technology,
and developing counters to the countermeasures. Computa-
tional propaganda is no different. There are at least three
distinct generations of social bots in existence at this time
[23]:
1) Simple bots – few behaviors and unconvincing profiles.
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2) Convincing ‘sock puppets’ – hundreds or thousands of
accounts following each other, to appear as a community
of like-minded citizens
3) Advanced ‘sock puppets’ – like gen 2, but precisely
targeted to infiltrate existing communities of interest
and inject their own messages in order to reframe the
discussion in their terms. Persona’s may exist across
multiple social media platforms.
We have described methods of detection that involve iden-
tifying characteristic features which differentiate the behavior
of propaganda bots from the behavior of human engaging in
political dialogue on social media It would stand to reason that
if malicious actors want to better hide their bots, they would
adopt more human-like behavior. In fact, there is evidence
that this type of countermeasure has been employed. [29].
The Indiana University team saw a 10% drop in AUC simply
by the addition of their manually annotated data, suggesting
that feature weights need frequent adjustment to adapt to even
normal behavior pattern changes [14].
However, there is a limit to how far an influence bot can
disguise itself and still have the desired impact [23]. In order to
promote a topic vociferously enough to ensure that the ranking
algorithms elevate that to a trending topic, a propaganda botnet
must create a sufficiently high number of messages in a short
amount of time. To do so would require either a large number
of bots acting in an abnormally coherent fashion, or a smaller
number of bots tweeting at abnormally high rates. As we have
seen, [1], [23], [24] both of these tactics produce temporal
signatures that are detectable to some degree by state of the
art classifiers.
Similarly, a botnet must have sufficient connectivity with
other users in the social network to promulgate its message.
One study characterized this type of information flow as a
‘viral cascade’ [32] which generates a fairly distinct signature.
There is reason to believe that propaganda bots will continue
to develop more sophistication, however. A recent in-depth
study of a specific botnet which operated for 35 weeks
during the Syrian uprising sheds light on the construction
and operation of an actual 3rd generation propaganda botnet
[29]. There are two very interesting features of this botnet.
First is that the botnet grew over time, rather than the entire
network bursting onto the scene simultaneously, as in Murthy’s
experiment [31]. The network started with two bots, grew to
about 80 by the end of the 35 weeks and had a total of 130 bots
participate during the lifespan of the network before Twitter
shut it down in week 35. The other interesting property is that
there were several discernible types of bots in the network.
Some were only run for two weeks and were thought to be
prototypes. The others can be divided into three classes.
1) Core bots – the network began with two in week one
and grew to 64 by week 28. These had a tweet rate of
rate of 1 tweet/1.8 min, or 1800/week. About 50% are
retweets of other core bots and the generator bot.
2) Peripheral bots – There were 15 of these. Their behavior
made it hard to classify them as bot or human. Their
tweet rate was less than 70/week.
3) Generator bot – there was only one of these. It created
original tweets at a rate of 2,100/week.
The diversity of this botnet’s ecosystem is likely a harbinger
of things to come as more experience is gained by malicious
actors.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The phenomena of employing bots to spread propaganda
is quite new, and the tactics are still developing. Likewise,
the techniques used to detect and mitigate these bots are still
in the formative stages. The successes today have largely
been in forensically determining the impact of computational
propaganda.
The field is beginning to converge on certain best practices
and best features for detection and characteristics of propa-
ganda botnets, but results are still inconsistent, and as bots
continue to become more sophisticated, the task of mitigating
them, and doing so in real time will become significantly more
challenging.
All but one of the studies discussed in this paper have used
Twitter as their source of data. The Twitter API makes it ex-
ceptionally easy for researchers to gather all the features they
need. Looking only at Twitter obviously introduces selection
bias when trying to infer influence trends in the general popu-
lation. This consideration should provide incentive to examine
other social media platforms. However, other platforms are
more challenging for instance Facebook does not generally
make content available, and WhatsApp now provides end-to-
end encryption for its users. With the recent changes in EU
privacy laws, and Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerburg called in
front of Congress over privacy abuses in the 2016 election,
it is reasonable to expect a more restrictive environment
in the future. Indeed in early 2018 a number of initiatives
to fund further research into combating fake news a.k.a.
computational propaganda have emerged [33]. It is uncertain
what the outcome will be as academic researchers find open
access to social media platforms becoming more restrictive,
while major social media companies find more incentive to
fund research for their own proprietary solutions.
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